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TERMINATION OF HOSPITAL MEDICAL
STAFF PRIVILEGES FOR ECONOMIC
REASONS: AN APPEAL FOR
CONSISTENCY
June D. Zellers*
Michael R. Poulin**
I INTRODUCTION
The relationship between physicians and hospitals is undergoing
significant change. Historically, a physician maintained a private
practice in the community and looked to the local hospital for ancil-
lary support when his or her patients were too ill to remain at home.
This community-based physician gained access to the hospital by
obtaining medical staff privileges. These privileges allowed the phy-
sician to admit patients to the hospital, treat patients while they
were there, and use the hospital's staff and equipment. The physi-
cian generally enjoyed the use of the privileges throughout his or her
active career, losing them only if found incompetent. Today, not all
physicians maintain a community-based practice. Instead, many are
employed by hospitals to staff various departments. Others enter
into exclusive contracts, either individually or as part of a practice
group, to provide certain services for hospitals.
Although these "hospital-based" physicians have a different eco-
nomic relationship with the hospital than traditional community-
based physicians, they usually have similar medical staff privileges.
Unlike community-based physicians, however, they may not enjoy
the use of their privileges throughout their active careers. Instead,
these physicians face the actual or constructive termination' of their
privileges whenever their contractual relationship with the hospital
changes.
Physicians who lose or cannot use their privileges for this reason
are suing hospitals with increasing frequency. The case law, how-
ever, has failed for the most part to articulate the legal principles
that govern these controversies.
This Article analyzes those cases arising from the loss of medical
staff privileges in private hospitals due to changes in the contractual
relationship between the hospital and the physician. It does not in-
* Director, Skelton, Taintor & Abbott; B.A. Univ. of Southern Maine (1982); J.D.
Univ. of Maine School of Law (1986).
** Director, Skelton, Taintor & Abbott; B.S. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
(1973); J.D. Univ. of Maine School of Law (1982).
1. Constructive termination of privileges occurs when the physician is denied ac-
cess to the hospital's equipment or facilities without having his privileges revoked.
See infra Part MI.
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clude cases arising from the loss of privileges for incompetence or
other disciplinary reasons or cases decided on antitrust grounds.
2
The Article identifies four kinds of economic relationships be-
tween hospitals and physicians.3 Using these classifications, the Ar-
ticle compares a recent case from Maine, Bartley v. Eastern Maine
Medical Center,4 and its precedents, with recent conflicting author-
ity from Tennessee, Lewisburg Community Hospital v. Alfredson5
The Article posits that the courts have reached opposite results on
similar facts for two reasons. One, the parties have neglected to set
forth clearly their agreement with respect to privileges. Conse-
quently, courts have been presented with contracts and bylaws that
are ambiguous, silent, or contradictory on the issue of privileges. For
instance, the contract b'etween the parties may not address the issue
of privileges8 or may conflict with the hospital bylaws,7 which usu-
ally have not been updated to reflect the contract between the par-
ties. Two, when faced with ambiguous or conflicting evidence, the
courts have overlooked a significant and often controlling fact: the
economic relationship between the physician and the hospital. This
Article suggests that courts should rely on the economic relationship
between the parties as the best extrinsic evidence of the parties' in-
tent with respect to privileges, including the physician's right of ac-
cess to the hospital's equipment and personnel. The Article con-
cludes with a discussion of how hospitals can modify their contracts
and bylaws to minimize the risk of unfavorable decisions in these
cases.
2. For a discussion of antitrust issues, see generally Robert J. Enders, Federal
Antitrust Issues Involved in the Denial of Medical Staff Privileges, 17 Loy. U. CH.
L.J. 331 (1986).
3. See infra Part II.
4. 617 A.2d 1020 (Me. 1992).
5. 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
6. See, e.g., Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d at 1020.
7. An example of the contract being inconsistent with the bylaws is Hospital
Corp. of Lake Worth v. Romaguera, 511 So. 2d 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). In this
case, a pathologist's exclusive contract provided for termination of his privileges upon
termination of the contract. Subsequent to entering into this contract, the hospital
amended its bylaws to provide that termination of a physician's contract would not
affect his or her medical staff privileges. Id. at 560. Apparently, this provision was
added to the bylaws in response to the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health-
care Organizations (hereinafter JCAHO) Standards which provide that physicians
with contractual relationships with the hospital will have their privileges defined
through the medical staff bylaws. Standard MS.2.16.6, Joint Commission on Accredi-
tation of Healthcare Organizations 1994 ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, at
70 (hereinafter 1994 JCAHO ACCREDITATION MANUAL). The court ruled that the sub-
sequent amendment of the bylaws modified the exclusive contract but only because it
expanded rather than restricted the physician's rights. Hospital Corp. of Lake Worth
v. Romaguera, 511 So. 2d at 560.
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IL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PHYsIcIANs AND HosprTALS:
PRIVILEGES AND ECONOMICS
Hospitals may be organized as private for-profit corporations, pri-
vate not-for-profit corporations, or public not-for-profit corpora-
tions. Regardless of the nature of corporate organization, a physician
generally has no automatic right to practice in either a public hospi-
tal or a private hospital.$
Medical staff privileges are the method by which physicians gain
access to the hospital, and the hospital controls the quality and
number of physicians who are permitted to practice within its facil-
ity.9 The procedure for granting and revoking privileges as well as
the applicable standards of conduct for physicians are embodied in
the medical staff bylaws.10
Medical staff privileges, however, are only part of the modem re-
lationship between hospitals and physicians. There is also an eco-
nomic relationship between the hospital and the physician. This ec-
onomic relationship may be viewed as a continuum of dependency.
At one end is the community-based physician. At the other is the
physician-employee of the hospital. In between are non-employee
hospital-based physicians.
The most economically independent is the community-based phy-
sician. The primary basis of a community-based physician's practice
is his or her office. It is there the physician sees and evaluates pa-
tients and decides what treatment is necessary. The physician's of-
fice practice is separate from the hospital and constitutes his or her
own private professional practice. The physician is free to reap the
benefits of this practice, including income, but is also responsible for
the burdens of the practice, including office management, overhead,
and fluctuations in cash flow.
The community-based physician's relationship with the hospital
revolves around patient care, particularly the quality of care pro-
vided by the physician. "Economic" decisions by the hospital, such
as the organization of the hospital, the services it offers, or the
equipment it provides, influence the decisions of a physician to
which hospital he or she will admit patients but otherwise have only
a marginal effect on the community-based physician's practice, un-
less the physician is located in a one-hospital area."
8. E.g., Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414, 416-17 (1927); see generally
Barbara Cray, Due Process Considerations in Hospital Staff Privilege Cases, 7 HAs.
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 217 (1979).
9. Sheree Lynn McCall, A Hospital's Liability for Denying, Suspending and
Granting Staff Privileges, 32 BAYLOR L REv. 175 (1980) (hereinafter McCall).
10. Standards MS.2-MS.3, 1994 JCAHO ACCREDrrATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at
66-72.
11. The primary concern of the community-based physician faced with a suspen-
sion, reduction, or revocation of his or her privileges is a full and fair opportunity to
explore the charges presented. The peer review and hearing requirements of medical
19941
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In contrast to the community-based physician, the hospital-based
physician is not truly an independent private practitioner. This phy-
sician has exchanged the freedom to reap all the economic advan-
tages of practice for certain benefits provided by the hospital such
as office management and stable cash flow.
There are three types of hospital-based physicians: (1) the physi-
cian-employee; (2) the "dependent" physician, whose services are
billed by the hospital; and (3) the "quasi-independent" physician,
who bills his or her services directly but who must have access to
hospital equipment and staff in order to render such services.
The physician-employee and the dependent physician have a sim-
ilar economic relationship with the hospital. In both cases, the hos-
pital has a direct economic interest in the cost/price structure of the
physician's practice. The more the hospital has to pay the physician,
the less revenue will be available for the hospital. If the hospital
decides to change the method of providing services or to terminate a
service, these physicians may see their positions diminished or even
eliminated.
Quasi-independent physicians, such as radiologists and anesthesi-
ologists, have a less direct economic impact on the hospital's bottom
line. They are, however, highly dependent on the hospital for access
to equipment and staff and rarely maintain an office practice sepa-
rate from the hospital. For these physicians, an inability to use the
hospital's equipment renders their medical staff privileges
meaningless.
Clearly, a hospital's relationship with a physician is much broader
than the relationship created by medical staff privileges alone. The
distinction between the parties' economic relationship and the rela-
tionship created by the granting of privileges is crucial to under-
standing the physician's right to exercise his privileges by having
access to the hospital's equipment and staff.
The hospital must control access by all physicians on the basis of
quality of care. 12 The hospital exercises this control through the
credentialing and privilege revocation procedures in its medical staff
bylaws, which must include a peer review process and notice and
staff bylaws are a result of this concern. Peer review is also required by the Medicare-
Medicaid program, 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.1-482.66, and may be required by state statute
and regulations, see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2503 (West 1990); 6 Code of
Maine Regulations, ch. 112, VI, XIX, and is a condition of accreditation by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Standards ES.1, GB.1,
1994 JCAHO ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 105-06, 113-16. In addition,
medical staff committee members of a professional review body are provided with
immunity from antitrust actions if the procedures comply with the Health Care Qual-
ity Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1988).
12. Standards MS.2-MS.3, 1994 JCAHO AcCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at
66-72.
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opportunity for a hearing.13 The hospital may also control access to
its equipment and staff on the basis of its own economic interests.
The hospital exercises this control not through the credentialing
process but through its contracts with physicians for certain
services. 4
I CONFLICTING APPROACHES BY COURTS
As the following analysis of the case law demonstrates, hospitals
have often neglected to articulate in contracts with physicians or in
their bylaws the scope of their discretion to control access for eco-
nomic reasons. A hospital has a strong economic interest in control-
ling the access of its employee and dependent physicians and a far
weaker economic interest in controlling the access of quasi-indepen-
dent and independent physicians. The distinction between these ec-
onomic interests has gone virtually unnoticed by some courts. As a
result, some courts have failed to appreciate the difference between
the hospital's control of access on the basis of quality of care and
the hospital's control of access on the basis of its own economic
interests.
Courts have historically taken one of three approaches to cases
involving termination of medical staff privileges. If the hospital is a
private hospital, the courts usually employ an express contract anal-
ysis based on the hospital bylaws.10 In some jurisdictions, the courts
view hospitals as quasi-public entities and employ an approach simi-
lar to a review of an administrative proceeding. ' If the hospital is a
public hospital, the courts also analyze the physician's property and,
or alternatively, liberty interests in the privileges granted and the
13. Standard MS.2.12, 1994 JCAHO AccREDrrTATON INUAL, supra note 7, at 68.
14. See, e.g., John D. Blum, Evaluation of Medical Staff Using Fiscal Factors:
Economic Credentialing, 26 J. HEALTH & HOsp. L. 65 (Mar. 1993); Kevin E. Grady,
Current Topics in Medical Staff Development and Credentialing, 26 J. HEALTH &
Hosp. L 193 (July, 1993).
15. Medical staff bylaws constitute an enforceable contract between a hospital
and its staff physicians. See, e.g., Bhatnagar v. Mid-Maine Medical Ctr., 510 A.2d
233, 234 (Me. 1986); see also Pariser v. Christian Health Care Sys., Inc., 816 F.2d
1248, 1251 (8th Cir. 1987); Posner v. Lankenau Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (E.D.
Pa. 1986); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 925 (W.D. Pa. 1981), affd, 688
F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Lawler v. Eugene Wuest-
hoff Memorial Hasp. Ass'n, 497 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Berber-
ian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 149 A.2d 456, 458 (Pa. 1959); St. John's
Hosp. Medical Staff v. St. John Regional Medical Ctr., Inc., 245 N.W.2d 472, 474
(S.D. 1976). See generally Barbara Cray, Due Process Considerations in Hospital
Staff Privileges Cases, 7 HASTINGS CoNsT. LQ. 217, 251-54 (1979) (hereinafter Cray);
McCall, supra note 9, at 183-86.
16. McCall, supra note 9, at 186-88; Cray, supra note 8, at 238-46. California
takes this approach. It is similar to the approach taken in the New Jersey case of
Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1963), which created a common law
right to due process in medical staff decisions. Contra Hottentot v. Mid-Maine Medi-
cal Ctr., 549 A.2d 365 (Me. 1988).
1994]
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corresponding constitutional due process requirements. 17
Most hospital-physician litigation today arises from the termina-
tion or expiration of an exclusive contract arrangement, 8 or the ter-
mination of an employment relationship.' For example, the hospital
may enter into a contract or employment relationship with a physi-
cian or group of physicians, giving the physician or group the exclu-
sive right to provide certain services at the hospital. The hospital
also grants the physician or physicians privileges. The hospital later
decides, for economic or other reasons, to terminate the contract or
employment, oftentimes giving the exclusive rights to a different en-
tity. The hospital may or may not attempt to terminate the physi-
cian's privileges. Once another entity obtains the exclusive right to
provide services, the hospital denies the physician access to the hos-
pital's facilities and staff. The physician finds himself both without
the contract and without the ability to exercise privileges at the
hospital.
Turning to the courts for assistance, the physician seeks to reas-
sert or reinstate his or her medical staff privileges as the method of
continuing to use the hospital's facilities and staff and thus preserve
the economic value of his relationship with the hospital. Sometimes
the physician can point to express provisions of the bylaws provid-
ing that her privileges are not contingent on employment contracts.
If, however, the contract does not address the issue of privileges or if
the bylaws have not been updated to reflect the effect of the addi-
tional contractual relationship, hospitals find themselves in the
anomalous position of appearing to have violated the bylaws each
time they terminate a contractual relationship. In addition, if the
hospital allows the physician continued access to its equipment and
staff, the hospital may violate the exclusive contract it has now
17. See Carolyn Quinn, Comment, Procedural Due Process Rights of Physicians
Applying for Hospital Staff Privileges, 17 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 453, 453-65 (1986). Only
in cases regarding public hospitals is the term "due process" used in its constitutional
sense. In all other cases where government action is not implicated, the use of the
term "due process" denotes notice and opportunity to be heard.
18. E.g., Bilek v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Ctr., No. 91-973 (Cir.
Ct. Leon Cty, Fla., Apr. 29, 1991); Palm Beach-Martin County Medical Ctr. v.
Panaro, 431 So. 2d 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Szczerbaniuk v. Memorial Hosp, for
McHenry County, 536 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. 2d 1989); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medi-
cal Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020 (Me. 1992); Anne Arundel Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. O'Brien, 432
A.2d 483 (Md. 1981); Lewisburg Community Hosp., Inc. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756
(Tenn. 1991). Cases may potentially arise, however, from a variety of economic deci-
sions made by hospitals. For instance, a hospital may decide to close a particular
unit, may decide not to replace or update certain equipment, or may decide to discon-
tinue certain procedures.
19. E.g., Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1988); En-
gelstad v. Virginia Mun. Hosp., 718 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1983); Williams v. Hobbs, 460
N.E.2d 287 (Ohio App. 1983); Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n of W. Pa., 311 A.2d
634 (Pa. 1973).
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given to someone else.
The physician who loses the right to use his or her privileges at a
private hospital for economic reasons may therefore present two dif-
ferent contracts for interpretation and enforcement: (1) the employ-
ment or exclusive contract between the hospital and the physician;
and (2) the contract created by the medical staff bylaws.2 0 Often one
or both of these contracts do not reflect accurately the understand-
ing between the physician and the hospital with respect to the exer-
cise of privileges. If the bylaws or any separate contract clearly de-
lineate the scope of the privileges granted, the courts need look no
further than these documents and may apply contract principles to
the facts. If the contract and bylaws are silent, ambiguous, or con-
tradict each other, the rationale for the courts' decisions has been
less understandable. Courts appear to be rewriting rather than en-
forcing the bargain struck by the parties. The result is a body of law
that undermines the contractual bargain of the parties and offers
little legal guidance to practitioners in drafting agreements and ad-
vising clients.
A. The Law Court Fails to Recognize the Economic Relationship
Between the Physician and the Hospital in
Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Center
1. The Case
Representative of courts' confusion in this area is a recent deci-
sion of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court,
Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Center.2 1 The plaintiffs in Bar-
tley were four emergency physicians employed by a group practice
that had an exclusive contract with Eastern Maine Medical Center
to provide physician services in the emergency department. When
the group practice lost its exclusive contract, the hospital denied the
physicians access to its emergency department. The physicians sued,
relying on the rights granted them in the medical staff bylaws.22 The
case reached the Law Court on the physicians' appeal of a grant of
summary judgment to the hospital.
The issue before the court in Bartley was whether the hospital
20. One way to sidestep physicians' claims under hospital bylaws is to declare that
such bylaws do not create an enforceable contract. That approach was recently taken
in St. Mary's Hosp. v. Radiology Prof. Corp., 421 S.E.2d 731, 736 (Ga. App. 1992).
21. 617 A.2d 1020 (Me. 1992). For a criticism of the Bartley case, see Chenen,
Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Center: Cost Containment Prevails Over Physi-
cian's Rights, 7 MEDICAL STAFF COUNSELOR 67 (1993).
22. Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d at 1021. The Law Court be-
gan its analysis on a tentative note, indicating that the medical staff bylaws "may
constitute an enforceable contract between the medical center and its staff physi-
cians." Id. (emphasis added). The court did not, however, pursue this line of reason-
ing. See supra note 20.
1994]
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had breached the contract created by the medical staff bylaws by
denying the physicians access to the hospital's equipment and staff
without providing notice and hearing as required by those bylaws.
The physicians relied on two separate provisions of the bylaws. The
first was an express provision that privileges were not contingent on
employment contracts.13 The second was that privileges could not be
reduced without notice and hearing. 4 The court found that these
two provisions did not prevent the hospital from denying the physi-
cians access to the hospital's equipment and staff and held that the
hospital did not breach the contract created by its bylaws2 5
The court gave essentially two grounds for its decision. First, it
found that the medical staff bylaws were "subject to the authority of
the hospital board of trustees, '26 which, being vested with the gen-
eral management of the affairs of the hospital, had the power to
enter into new contracts for the staffing of the emergency depart-
ment and otherwise manage the hospital's departments.2 7
Second, the Law Court found that the physicians were not enti-
tled to the notice and hearing provisions of the bylaws because these
provisions were applicable only to "major corrective action."28 As
defined by the bylaws, corrective action occurs when there is a rec-
ommendation that a physician's privileges be reduced.29 The court
reasoned, however, that the physicians' privileges were not reduced
because a grant of privileges did not include the right to use the
privileges.30 Since the physicians' privileges were still intact, the
court found the notice and hearing provisions inapposite.3 1
23. Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d at 1022 (citing Art. III,
§ C(5) of the bylaws which provides: "Physicians who are employed or are under
contract to the Medical Center shall be appointed through the same procedure used
for all members of the medical staff. Continuation of membership shall not be made
contingent on continuance of such employment or contract.").
24. Brief for Appellants at 9, Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d
1020 (Me. 1992) (No. PEN-92-211) (citing Art. III, § E(1)(a) of the bylaws). The ex-
clusive contract was apparently silent on the issue of privileges as no mention was
made of its terms.
25. Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d at 1023.
26. Id. at 1022.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1023.
29. Id. The bylaws provided that "privileges may be reduced or terminated only
when it is found, after a substantial notice and hearing process, that 'the activity or
professional conduct of any medical staff member ... is ... lower than the stan-
dards or aims of the Medical Center.'" (emphasis in original). Brief for Appellants at
9 (citing Art. III § E(1)(a) of the bylaws).
30. Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d at 1023 (citing Engelstad v.
Virginia Mun. Hosp., 718 F.2d 262, 268 (8th Cir. 1983); Holt v. Good Samaritan
Hosp. & Health Ctr., 590 N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (Ohio App. 1990)).
31. Id. at 1023.
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2. Analysis
Bartley contains no mention of the terms of the exclusive contract
between the physicians and the hospital. This omission leaves the
reader to assume that the contract addressed neither termination of
privileges nor access to facilities and staff once the contract was ter-
minated. Further, the reader is not given a complete understanding
of the terms of the bylaws. This prevents the reader from determin-
ing the economic relationship between the parties, although the hos-
pital's brief pointed out that the physicians were hospital-based
physicians whose services were billed by the hospital . 2 In the end,
the reader is left with the impression that the court redefined, with-
out attention to the bylaws or the contract, the concept of medical
staff privileges and used this new definition, in combination with its
expansive reading of the discretion granted the hospital's board of
trustees, to undermine the notice and hearing rights granted under
the bylaws.
a. The Bartley Court's Treatment of the Grant of Privileges v.
The Right to Exercise Privileges
The Bartley court defined hospital medical staff privileges to
mean only that the physicians were qualified to practice at the hos-
pital not that the physicians had the right to exercise the privi-
leges.33 The court then said that in order to use the privileges, some-
thing else was necessary for hospital-based physicians but not for
community-based physicians.3 4 The court, however, did not identify
any language in the bylaws that differentiated between the grant of
privileges and the exercise of privileges or between privileges
granted to hospital-based physicians as distinguished from other
physicians.3 5 Nor did the court identify anything in the exclusive
contract that supported these distinctions.
If the court had explained the distinction between hospital-based
32. Generally, hospitals include in their billings the fee generated by their emer-
gency physicians, which would make these physicians "dependent" physicians as that
term is used in this Article. This classification may be inferred from the court's not-
ing that the new contract contained a "compensation arrangement more favorable to
the hospital." Id. at 1021. The hospital's brief on appeal pointed out that the hospital
controlled the physicians' pricing and billing practices under which the physicians
received 80.8% of the professional charges billed through the emergency department.
Brief for Appellee at 4, 7, Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020 (Mhe.
1992) (No. PEN-92-211). In addition, the hospital eventually adopted an employment
relationship with its emergency room physicians, thus increasing the hospital's eco-
nomic control.
33. Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d at 1023.
34. Id. The court referred to these physicians as "general practitioners."
35. See infra text accompanying notes 40, 54 & 65 for a discussion of cases in
which the courts analyzed the specific provisions of the bylaws to support their deci-
sion regarding the meaning of privileges.
1994]
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physicians and general practitioners in terms of their different eco-
nomic relationships with the hospital, the court's basis for the dis-
tinction between the grant of privileges and the right to use privi-
leges would be more understandable. In addition, these differences
could have been used to analyze properly the cases relied on by the
court.
i. The Basis for the Distinction Between the Grant and the
Exercise of Privileges
Two seminal cases, cited by the Bartley court, have recognized the
distinction between the grant and the exercise of hospital privileges.
The first case is Engelstad v. Virginia Municipal Hospital,0 de-
cided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in 1983. Dr. Engelstad was an employee-at-will of the hospital.8 7
When he lost his job as the director of the pathology department,
Dr. Engelstad sued for damages alleging that the hospital had failed
to provide him appropriate notice and hearing.3 8 The court held that
Dr. Engelstad was not entitled to a hearing under the bylaws.8 9 The
court noted that the bylaws granted physicians the right to treat
patients. This right, however, did not apply to Dr. Engelstad who, as
a pathologist, did not treat patients. In the case of pathologists, the
bylaws provided that their privileges were defined by the medical
staff executive committee. 0 The court also found that Dr. Engel-
stad's staff privileges had not been reduced since he had been of-
fered an arrangement with the hospital to continue as a staff
pathologist.4 1
In other words, the physician in Engelstad was an employee
whose privileges under the bylaws were expressly distinguished from
the privileges granted to independent physicians. The contract cre-
ated by the bylaws accurately reflected the parties' economic rela-
tionship. Moreover, the physician had declined other employment
that would have allowed him to exercise his privileges. The court's
decision was consistent with the parties' contract and their economic
relationship. These facts show that Engelstad is clearly distinguish-
able from Bartley.
The other case relied on by the Bartley court was Holt v. Good
36. 718 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1983).
37. Id. at 266.
38. Because the hospital was a public hospital, Dr. Engelstad relied on both 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the hospital bylaws for his right to a hearing. Engelstad v. Virginia
Mun. Hosp., 718 F.2d at 263. On the civil rights claim, the court found that because
Dr. Engelstad did not have a property interest in his employment with the hospital,
he had no protected interest sufficient to require a due process hearing. Id. at 266.
39. Engelstad v. Virginia Mun. Hosp., 718 F.2d at 269.
40. Id. at 264.
41. Id. at 269.
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Samaritan Hospital and Health Center.42 Dr. Holt held an exclu-
sive contract with the hospital that entitled him to provide emer-
gency room services. Dr. Holt lost the exclusive contract and subse-
quently refused to work for the physicians who were awarded the
new contract.43 And, like the physician in Engelstad, Dr. Holt had
the opportunity to exercise his privileges but chose not to."
Dr. Holt was, in all likelihood, a dependent hospital-based physi-
cian whose services were billed by the hospital. 5 Holt does not ap-
pear to be factually distinguishable from Bartley.
Both Engelstad and Holt conclude that having privileges at a hos-
pital does not confer the unimpeded right to exercise those privi-
leges.46 Lost-in the analysis is the distinguishing fact that the right
to exercise privileges is related to the economic relationship between
the parties and in these cases was limited to dependent hospital-
based physicians. This distinction was controlling in the seminal
case to address this issue, Adler v. Montefiore Hospital Association
of Western Pennsylvania.47
ii. Origin of the Distinction Between the Grant and the Exercise
of Privileges
The genesis for the distinction between the grant of privileges and
the ability to exercise privileges is found in Adler v. Montefiore Hos-
pital Association of Western Pennsylvania. Dr. Adler was a cardiol-
ogist who lost his part-time employment as the Director of the Car-
diology Lab at Montefiore Hospital. In addition to this part-time
42. 590 N.E.2d 1318 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
43. Id. at 1319.
44. Id. The court in Holt relied primarily on four cases, rather than an analysis of
the economic relationship between the parties, to support its holding. These cases are
all distinguishable. First, the court relied on Lewin v. St. Joseph Hosp., 146 Cal. Rptr.
892 (Ct. App. 1978), a case that employed the administrative law analysis to hospital
privileging issues. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Second, the court relied
on Anne Arundel Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. O'Brien, 432 A.2d 483 (hMd. Ct. Spec. App.
1981). In that case, however, the physician was granted privileges for a limited period
of time only;, the physician's privileges and contract expressly terminated at the ame
time. See infra note 69. The court also relied on Collins v. Associated Pathologists,
Ltd., 844 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1988). Collins, however, is an antitrust case. The contrac-
tual issues are dismissed in one paragraph at the end of a lengthy decision. See infra
text accompanying notes 55-60. Collins is factually similar to Holt, though, in that
both physicians were dependent, hospital-based physicians whose services were billed
by the hospital. Finally, the Holt court relied on Williams v. Hobbs, 460 N.E.2d 287
(Ohio Ct. App. 1983). Williaums is similar to Holt in that the issue turned on the
employment status of the physician. Williams, unlike Holt, involved a quasi-indepen-
dent physician.
45. Unlike the court in Engelstad, the court in Holt did not address the economic
relationship between the parties.
46. Engelstad v. Virginia Mun. Hasp., 718 F.2d at 262, 267-69; Holt v. Good Sa-
maritan Hosp. and Health Ctr., 590 N.E.2d at 1319-21.
47. 311 A-2d 634 (Pa. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974).
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employment, Dr. Adler maintained a private practice with two of-
fices, and had privileges at three other hospitals.4 8 As the part-time
Director of the Cardiology Lab, Dr. Adler was the only physician
authorized to perform certain procedures using hospital
equipment.
49
The Adler court found that Dr. Adler's right to perform these pro-
cedures using the hospital's equipment arose solely from his employ-
ment as Director of the Laboratory and not from any grant of staff
privileges. 50 Since Dr. Adler continued to enjoy the right and au-
thority to admit and treat patients at the hospital, and since his
rights to perform certain procedures using hospital equipment did
not arise from his privileges, the court held that Dr. Adler had no
right to a hearing under the hospital bylaws. 51 In other words, the
contractual basis for Dr. Adler's access to equipment was not the
contract formed by the bylaws but the contract formed through his
employment. Since the hospital had not breached his employment
contract, he had no right to relief for the loss of access to the hospi-
tal's equipment.
In short, Dr. Adler was a dual-status physician. He gained the
right to use certain equipment because he was employed by the hos-
pital. The loss of access to such equipment, however, did not have a
major effect on Dr. Adler's practice because in all other respects he
was an independent community-based physician who maintained a
private practice and continued to admit and treat patients at the
hospital.
iii. Distortion of the Distinction Between the Grant and the
Exercise of Privileges
Over time the reasoning of Adler has become divorced from its
unique underlying facts. One reason arises from a failure to under-
stand or articulate the underlying economic relationship between
the hospital and the physician. An example of this failure is Wil-
liams v. Hobbs.52
In Williams, the complaining physician was fired from the group
practice that held the exclusive contract to provide radiology ser-
vices to the hospital. The court found that the physician's privileges
were indeed terminated. The court found that no breach of the hos-
pital's medical staff bylaws arose from the termination.5" Instead,
the court held that employment by the exclusive contractor was one
of the qualifications for hospital staff privileges in the department of
48. Id. at 636.
49. Id. at 637.
50. Id. at 644-45.
51. Id. at 638.
52. 460 N.E.2d 287 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
53. Id. at 292.
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radiology. Once the physician lost this employment relationship, he
was no longer qualified to hold privileges. Although the court quoted
liberally from the bylaws, it identified no bylaw provision that im-
posed employment as a condition of privileges."
The court in Williams did not discuss the economic relationship
between the radiologist and the hospital. Radiologists are quasi-in-
dependent physicians who bill for their own services. Unlike Dr. Ad-
ler who gained access to the hospital's equipment through his em-
ployment relationship with the hospital, radiologists maintain a
certain independence from the hospital. The hospital's economic in-
terest in restricting a radiologist's access to its equipment and staff
is no greater than its economic interest in restricting a surgeon's ac-
cess to its operating room. Also, unlike Dr. Adler, without access to
a hospital's equipment and staff, radiologists are not able to exercise
any of their privileges. The court in Williams erred by adopting an
analysis based on the employment relationship between the physi-
cian and the hospital. Since the radiologist in Williams was econom-
ically independent from the hospital, the analysis found in Adler is
inapposite.
The analysis in Adler is appropriate when the physician is not
independent from the hospital, and his economic relationship with
the hospital does determine the nature of his privileges. For in-
stance, in Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd.,*" a dependent
hospital-based pathologist, whose services were billed by the hospi-
tal, lost his employment with the holder of the exclusive provider of
pathology services to the hospital.56 Like the court in Williams, the
Collins court held that the physician's ability to exercise his privi-
leges was dependent on his employment relationship with the exclu-
sive contract holder.57 The court in Collins stated that it could not
compel the hospital to enter into a contractual relationship with Dr.
Collins in derogation of its exclusive contract with another
provider.58
One must look to the trial court opinion in Collins, however, to
understand the basis for this conclusion. When Dr. Collins lost his
job with the exclusive provider, he asked the hospital to employ
him. The hospital refused. 59 The trial court found that the grant of
privileges did not entitle a physician to an employment contract
with the hospital.6 0 In other words, in order to exercise pathology
54. Id. at 291-92.
55. 844 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1988).
56. Id. at 475.
57. Id. at 481.
58. Id.
59. Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 676 F. Supp. 1388, 1392-93 (CJD. ilL
1987).
60. Id. at 1410.
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privileges it was necessary to have a second contract or financial ar-
rangement with the hospital. This was necessary because the hospi-
tal, not the physician, billed the patient for pathology services.
Without the second contract, there was no way for the pathologist to
be paid. Therefore, the reasoning of Collins should be applied only
to employee and dependent hospital-based physicians.
The courts in Collins and Williams struggle to articulate the rela-
tionship between the grant of privileges and the exercise of privi-
leges but fail to recognize that the relationship is governed by the
economic relationship between the physician and the hospital. In
the ideal case, the relationship between the exercise of privileges
and any contract between the parties is defined in both the hospi-
tal's bylaws and the physician's separate contract with the hospital.
Sometimes the court can infer this relationship from the facts
presented. In most cases, however, this relationship is ignored. Un-
less the economic relationship between the parties is recognized as
the distinguishing fact in these cases, any physician whose practice
relies heavily on continued access to the hospital's equipment and
personnel may be without legal recourse when his or her privileges
are constructively terminated by a denial of that access.
b. Recognition of the Economic Relationship Between the
Physician and the Hospital
The economic relationship between the hospital and the physician
and its effect on the physician's privileges was recognized in Lewis-
burg Community Hospital v. Alfredson.61 Dr. Alfredson was the sole
provider of radiological services to the hospital under two consecu-
tive contracts. In his second contract with the hospital, he negoti-
ated the deletion of a clause providing that his clinical privileges
would terminate if the contract was canceled without cause. 2 Even-
tually, Alfredson's contract was canceled. Technically, he retained
his privileges, but the hospital denied him access to its equipment
and staff.6 3 Alfredson then sued the hospital.8 '
The hospital made the same arguments raised in Bartley. The
Tennessee court, however, found them unpersuasive for three rea-
sons. First, the court painstakingly reviewed the medical staff by-
laws but found no support in their language for differentiating be-
tween the grant of privileges and the ability to exercise them.05 The
court concluded that the grant of privileges must embody the ability
61. 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
62. Id. at 757.
63. Id. at 757-58.
64. Id. at 758. Alfredson sued on multiple grounds, all of which were disposed of
by summary judgment. The only issue addressed on appeal was the breach of con-
tract issue.
65. Id. at 760.
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to exercise those privileges, based on the absence in the bylaws of
any provisions to the contrary.
Second, the court implicitly recognized the economic relationship
between the hospital and the physician when it explained that,
"[w]ith hospital-based specialties such as radiology, the inability to
use the hospital facilities and staff would have rendered the clinical
privileges meaningless."66 As a radiologist, Alfredson was most likely
a quasi-independent physician who billed separately for his own ser-
vices. In order to do so, however, he required access to the hospital's
equipment and staff.
Finally, the court concluded, based on the unique facts of the
case, that the hospital had made an economic decision when it
agreed to delete the automatic termination of privileges provision
from the physician's contract.67 The hospital was bound by that de-
cision just as it was bound by its decision to enter into a different
exclusive contract. The court's finding-that the hospital had re-
duced the physician's privileges by denying him access to equipment
and staff 68-is an implicit recognition of the underlying economic
relationship.
The court in Alfredson used the economic relationship between
the physician and the hospital to bolster its conclusion regarding the
effect of changes in the physician's contractual relationship with the
hospital. This evidence is not needed, however, to construe exclusive
contracts that either expressly address the issue of privileges c or are
66. Id. at 761. Of course, this reasoning should be applied only to quasi-indepen-
dent physicians. The hospital privileges of dependent physicians are similarly mean-
ingless without access to the hospital's equipment and staff. These latter physicians
cannot, however, gain access without some additional contract with the hospital.
67. Id. at 759.
68. Id. at 762.
69. For instance, in Anne Arundel Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. O'Brien, 432 A.2d 483 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1981), a professional association of radiologists, headed by Dr. David
A. O'Brien, enjoyed an exclusive contract entitling them to provide radiology cover-
age to the hospital. Id. at 485. The contract and the radiologists' medical staff privi-
leges expired on the same date. Id. When the contract was not renewed, but instead
was awarded to another radiology group, O'Brien's group sued the hospital on a vari-
ety of theories, including breach of contract, equitable estoppel, interference with
business relationship, violation of federal and state antitrust laws, fraud, and viola-
tion of due process. Id. at 484. The trial court ordered the hospital to provide the
O'Brien group a "due process" hearing under the hospital's bylaws. The appellate
court reversed, finding that the O'Brien group's rights under both their contract and
the medical staff bylaws expired by agreement. Id. at 490. It is unclear from the
O'Brien decision whether the bylaws permitted termination of privileges for economic
reasons such as the expiration of an exclusive contract. At least one court has found
that privileges cannot be terminated for economic reasons if the bylaws do not ex-
pressly authorize the termination. Bilek v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical
Ctr., (No. 91-973), slip op. at 4 (Cir. Ct. Leon Cty, Fi., Apr. 29, 1991).
The O'Brien court also did not discuss whether the contract itself indicated that
privileges would be terminated upon its expiration. The absence of this discussion
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consistent with the scope of privileges granted under the bylawsY.
The confusion seen in these cases arises from a failure to explore
the economic relationship between the parties as the most reliable
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent regarding privileges if the
documents themselves are unclear. If the limitations on privileges
are clear from the plain language of the contract, this extrinsic evi-
dence is not needed and should not be used to override the actual
bargain of the parties."' If the contractual language is ambiguous or
arises from the peculiar facts of the case. Usually, medical staff privileges are granted
for a specific term such as one or two years. For the O'Brien group, however, the
hospital departed from its usual practice by limiting the appointments to approxi-
mately five months. Anne Arundel Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. O'Brien, 432 A.2d at 486. The
hospital notified each radiologist in the O'Brien group of the expiration date of his or
her appointment, and each radiologist signed an acceptance letter. As the court
noted, "none objected to or appealed from the appointment of limited duration." Id.
Thus, the court went no further than holding the parties to the terms of their bar-
gain. Although the physicians were presumably quasi-independent physicians, they
had failed to protect the value of their economic relationship with the hospital by
agreeing to a limitation on their ability to exercise their privileges.
70. E.g., Szczerbaniuk v. Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County, 536 N.E.2d 138
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989). As in O'Brien, the hospital in Szczerbaniuk contracted with a
radiologist to provide exclusive services to the hospital. The contract provided that it
could be canceled by either party for cause by giving 180 days' written notice. The
contract also expressly provided that membership on the medical staff was termi-
nated if the contract was terminated. Id. at 139.
The physician alleged that termination of his privileges was a breach of the medical
staff bylaws because the medical staff bylaws formed part of his contract with the
hospital. Id. at 140. The trial court dismissed this part of the complaint, and the
appellate court affirmed the dismissal. Id. at 140, 143. The appellate court found the
exclusive contract between the parties controlling for four reasons. First, the exclusive
contract expressly addressed the issue of medical staff privileges. Second, the exclu-
sive contract did not expressly incorporate the medical staff bylaws. Third, the con-
tract recited that it was the entire agreement of the parties. Finally, the contract
contained procedures for resolving problems that were inconsistent with the bylaws.
Id. at 143. In other words, the exclusive contract both defined and governed the eco-
nomic relationship between the parties and overrode inconsistent provisions in the
bylaws. Again, the quasi-independent physician had failed to protect the economic
value of his contract with the hospital.
71. An example of the misuse of such extrinsic evidence is Palm Beach-Martin
County Medical Ctr. v. Panaro, 431 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), which
involved an exclusive contract for anesthesiology services. There the medical staff by-
laws provided that loss of a contractual relationship with the hospital was cause for
termination of privileges. The bylaws also required a recommendation of "cause"
from the medical staff in order to revoke privileges. Dr. Panaro's privileges were re-
voked when his contract was terminated; however, no recommendation was made by
the medical staff. Id. at 1024.
The court correctly found that the hospital had not complied with the procedural
requirements of the bylaws in revoking Dr. Panaro's privileges. The court, however,
also found a substantive breach of the bylaws by holding that the bylaws were inter-
nally inconsistent. Id.
The court compared the above-referenced portion of the bylaws that required cause
for termination with the provision of the bylaws that required the grounds for termi-
nation not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. Although the bylaws defined loss
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contradictory, this evidence gives the courts a reasoned basis upon
which to determine the scope of a physician's right of access to a
hospital's equipment and staff.
c. The Hospital's Discretion to Make Economic Decisions
The second aspect of the Bartley opinion that deserves clarifica-
tion is the breadth of the hospital's power to impose ad hoc restric-
tions on privileges. The Bartley court found the hospital had broad
discretion to enter into contracts and otherwise manage the hospital.
This recognition of the hospital's broad discretion is in accord with
the conclusion reached by most courts in evaluating a hospital's
ability to enter into exclusive contracts.
72
The Bartley decision is unclear with respect to how the hospital's
discretion to manage its business relates to the specific rights and
obligations granted under the medical staff bylaws. The confusion
may be due in part to an inadequate discussion of the significance of
the bylaw provision that provided, "continuation of staff member-
ship shall not be made contingent on the continuance of an employ-
ment contract. '7 3 The Bartley decision can be read to mean that the
hospital's general managerial discretion to enter into contracts pro-
vides the unilaterally legal entitlement to overrule express provi-
sions of the medical staff bylaws.
The discretion to enter into a contract, however, is not synony-
of a contract as "cause" for termination of privileges, the court found that the termi-
nation was not "arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious" and therefore no cause existed
for the termination. Id.
Anesthesiologists are generally quasi-independent physicians who bill separately
for their services. The court apparently recognized this economic relationship be-
tween the parties. It noted that the loss of privileges would prevent Dr. Panaro from
practicing anesthesiology and that he would have no means of support. Id.
Despite the parties' economic relationship, the bylaws permitted termination of
privileges on the grounds asserted. Consequently, the court had no need to look be-
yond the documents in order to decide the case. What should have been a simple case
of breach by the hospital caused by procedural error was complicated needlessly by
an analysis that disregards the basic terms of the parties' contract. Had the bylaws
not defined cause as including the loss of a contract, the court's exploration of this
issue may have been justified. But the parties had provided for this eventuality in
their contract; it was not for the court to disregard it.
72. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Humana, Inc., 495 So. 2d 630 (Ala. 1986); Dattilo v.
Tucson Gen. Hosp., 533 P.2d 700 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Redding v. St. Francis Medi-
cal Ctr., 255 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Radiology Professional Corp. v. Trin-
idad Area Health Ass'n, 577 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1978); Rush v. City of St. Petersburg, 205
So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Brandon v. Combs, 666 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. Ct. App.
1983); Hottentot v. Mid-Maine Medical Ctr., 549 A.2d 365 (Me. 1988); Benell v. City
of Virginia, 104 N.W.2d 633 (Minn. 1960); Holt v. Good Samaritan Hosp. and Health
Ctr., 590 N.E.2d 1318 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Williams v. Hobbs, 460 N.E.2d 287 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1983); Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n of W. Pa., 311 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1973).
73. Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020, 1022 (citing Medical
Staff Bylaws Art. III, § C(5)).
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mous with the unilateral right to terminate a contract. The hospital
has the same discretion to terminate a contract according to its
terms as it has to decide to breach a contract. It is the terms of the
contract that dictate the conditions under which it may be termi-
nated without a breach occurring. Thus, a hospital cannot ignore or
override the express requirements of a contract without breaching it.
Although the Law Court correctly analyzed the breadth of a hos-
pital's discretion in making economic decisions, it failed to apply
this analysis to the facts presented. An explanation of the economic
relationship between the hospital and the physicians was needed.
Otherwise, there is no reasoned basis why the hospital, in the exer-
cise of its discretion, could not restrict or reduce for economic rea-
sons any physician's access to the hospital without providing notice
or opportunity to be heard as required by the bylaws. For quasi-
independent and independent physicians, restriction or reduction of
the physician's access to the hospital is a constructive reduction of
the physician's privileges.
If the physicians in Bartley were indeed dependent hospital-based
physicians, then it was the hospital's economic interest in the profit-
ability of the services it rendered that would provide the limiting
principle for the exercise of this discretion. Absent a showing of a
similar economic interest in the profitability to the hospital of ser-
vices rendered by other physicians, the hospital's discretion may not
provide unfettered power to deny other physicians access to the hos-
pital's equipment and staff for economic rather than competency
reasons.
The Bartley decision also fails to analyze the significance of the
provision in the medical staff bylaws that prohibits making the con-
tinuation of privileges contingent on continued employment with
the hospital.74 Although the physicians relied on this provision to
support their right to relief, the court does not explain why it is
inapplicable to the facts presented.
The court could have explained that the physicians in Bartley
were not employed by or under contract with the hospital, but by an
entity that had contracted with the hospital. Apparently their em-
ployment with this entity continued. Consequently their employ-
ment status had no relevance to their privileges, nor did they have a
direct contractual relationship with the hospital71 Therefore, even
without the distinction drawn by the court between the grant of
74. See id. at 1022.
75. Compare with supra text accompanying notes 36-46. In both Engelstad and
Holt, the physicians refused to continue their employment relationship, Engelstad
with the hospital and Holt with the exclusive contract holder. Similarly, in Collins
(see supra text accompanying notes 55-60), the physician had been fired from his
employment with the exclusive contract holder. None of these cases, however, cites a
bylaws provision similar to the provision in Bartley.
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privileges and the exercise of privileges, the cited provision of the
medical staff bylaws can be construed to offer no protection to the
physicians in Bartley. Consequently, the board of trustees did not
override this express provision of the medical staff in refusing the
physicians' access to its equipment and staff. Conversely, with the
distinction drawn by the court between the grant and the exercise of
privileges, this portion of the holding seems unnecessary.
Bartley should not be read for the proposition that hospitals have
unfettered discretion to override the express provisions of medical
staff bylaws without risking an action for breach of contract. A care-
ful review of the factual underpinning of the court's holding shows
that this discretion is not unlimited. Like any other business entity,
a hospital may choose to breach any of its contractual obligations.
But if it does, it may be liable for damages for breach of contract.
IV. A CALL FOR CLARrrY
The confusion surrounding these disputes and the resulting litiga-
tion could be reduced, if not eliminated, by amending hospital and
medical staff bylaws and by ensuring that all hospital-based physi-
cians have written contracts with clearly defined termination
clauses. Hospitals should take the lead in redesigning their bylaws
to eliminate many of the problems outlined above. The mutual un-
derstandings and expectations of the hospital and the physicians
should be set forth in plain language. The issue is one of reasonable
notice to the physician of the scope and limitations of his or her
rights to use the hospital's facilities, equipment, and staff.
Medical staff bylaws should define the rights of the physician who
has been granted privileges. For instance, they should state to what
extent the privileges include the right to use hospital equipment,
facilities, and staff necessary to provide services. If these rights vary,
the bylaws should distinguish between physicians who are commu-
nity-based and physicians who are hospital employees or who are
otherwise hospital-based.
In addition, the hospital and medical staff bylaws should ex-
pressly reserve to the hospital governing board the right to termi-
nate any health service or change any method of delivering such ser-
vices, including exclusive contracting and directly employing
physicians. The bylaws should make clear that this authority super-
sedes the grant of privileges to a physician.
Next, bylaws should distinguish between termination of privileges
for competence or disciplinary reasons and termination of privileges
for business or economic reasons, by providing notice, an opportu-
nity to be heard, and peer review for the former, but only a reasona-
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ble period of advance notice for the latter.7 6
The bylaws should also provide that employment and other con-
tracts with physicians that provide for the withdrawal of privileges
will supersede applicable bylaw provisions regarding privileges. Hos-
pitals should bargain for contracts that provide for automatic with-
drawal of privileges when the contract expires or is terminated.
Where the contract is with a physician group or corporation, the
contractor should be required to maintain employment agreements
with its physician employees that provide for automatic resignation
from the hospital upon termination of employment.
Finally, substantive changes in the bylaws should coincide or be-
come effective with the physicians' biannual renewal of privileges.7
Since privileges are granted for a specific term, arguably they are
not subject to unilateral modification during that term. Making such
changes effective upon renewal gives physicians fair notice and is
consistent with contract law principles.
The case law in this area need not be confusing. What is needed is
clear draftsmanship, updated bylaws, and litigants who provide the
courts with an understanding of the economic relationships between
the hospitals and physicians.
76. This is analogous to the distinction between an employer discharging an em-
ployee for cause and an employer eliminating a position through layoff or reduction
in force. Generally even where employment contracts or collective bargaining agree-
ments provide "due process" protection, it does not apply to a layoff.
77. Medical staff privileges are typically granted for two-year periods. In fact,
JCAHO standards require that privileges be granted for not more than two years.
MS.2.13, JCAHO, 1994 JCAHO ACCREDITATIoN MANUAL, supra note 7, at 68.
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